: [1J Div,oree-Foreign Deeree&-E1fect of Prior Decree for Separate Maintenanee.-Although there is a subsisting separate maintenance decree, another jurisdiction can grant a divorce to one of the parties and validly terminate the relation of husband and wife. 1 [2] ld.-Foreign Deeree&-llona Fides of ltesidenee.-A finding' that plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Mexico at the time he procured a second divorce decree from his first wife was sustained by evidence that he had resided there for approximately 18 months, that he was unable to work except that he was writing books and short stories while in Mexico, that he was a retired Army officer whose pension was not sufficient to support him in the United States and he therefore lived in Mexico, that he leased a residence in Mexico and bis furniture had been there for a long time and was there at the time of trial, and that he expected to return to Mexico when the litigation was terminated and live there the rest of his life.
[S] Id.-Foreign Deeree&-Validity-Full Faith and Credit.-A second divorce decree which plaintiff procured in Mexico from his first wife was valid where a Mexican attorney, whoqualiiled as an expert on the laws of Mexico, testifl.ed that he examined the divorce proceedings and the decree granted and that under the laws of Mexico plaintiff had been granted a valid divorce decree which would be recognized all over Mexico, thus making applicable the general rule that where a party has established a bona llde residence in Mexico and obtained a Mexican divorce decree, such decree is entitled to full faith and credit in California.
['] Id.-Foreign Deeree&-1njunctioDB Against.-Where an ex parte injunction restraining plaintiff from proceeding with a second divorce action in Mexico was issued some weeks after a her.ring in such' proceeding in :which plaintiff personally testifl.ed and such injunction was never served on him and he had no personal knowledge of it until after the divorce was granted, . the injunction could not invalida,te the divorce decree.
[ vii. In January 1955 plaintiff, having retired from the United States Army, went to Gnadalajara, in the State of · J alisco, Republic of Mexico, and employed an attorney to ,obtain another divorce from Winifred. The attorney filed an action in the State of Jalisco, but the judge refused to hear' · the case, saying that, so far as he was concerned, the Mexican · divorce which plaintiff had procured in 1952 was valid and · that plaintiff could obtain a rehearing on it only under an-: other set of circumstances and charges in the State of : Chihuahua. : viii. In January 1956 plaintiff went back to Juarez, in : the State of Chihuahua, and filed a complaint for divorce against Winifred, a copy of which was served upon her by mail in Omaha, Nebraska. The hearing in this divorce proceeding was held on January 14,1956, at which time plaintiff personally testified therein.
ix. March 2, 1956, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, upon the application of defendant Winifred, after service by mail on plaintiff, issued the following injunction: "IT Is THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant, JOHN W. SCOTT, his servants and his agents, be permanently restrained and enjoined from proceeding with, and from maintaining the validity of, any divorce proceeding, or divorce decree obtained, in that certain proceeding instituted by defendant herein on or about the 16th day of January, 1956, against plaintiff herein for a divorce in the Second Civil Court, City of Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, the copies of the Summons and Complaint in said proceedings having been served upon the plaintiff herein on or about the 25th day of January, 1956, as is more fully described in the Affidavit of Winifred C. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit, saying. at page 546: "The State has a considerable interest in prevent-ing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring of marriages from being bastardized" and again, at page 549: "Thc result in this situation is to make the divorce divisibleto givc effect to thc Nevada decrce insofar as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony. This finding is amply supported by the following evidence in the record: (a) Plaintiff had resided in Mexico from January 5, 1955, to about July 1956; (b) he was unable to work, except that he was writing books and short stories while in Mexico; (c) he was a retired Army officer, whose pension was not sufficient to support him in the United States, and he therefore lived in Mexico, where his expenses were less; (d) he leased a residence in Mexico, and his furniture had been there for a long period of time and was there at the time of trial; and (e) he expected to return to Mexico when the present litigation was terminated and live there the· rest of his life.
[ 
1956'
No. The ex parte injunction restraining plaintiff from pro-SOO'rl'1J. SCOTT [51 C.2d ceeding with the second divorce action ill Mexico was never served on him, and he had no personal knowledge of it until after the divorce had becn grantcd. Thc injunction was issued Oil :March 2, 19G6, but the hearing in the diYorce proceeding had becn held some weeks prior to that time, with plaintiff personally testifying therein, on January 14, 1956. Therefore, the California court purported to enjoin plaintiff from taking action which he had already taken.
[5] Obviously an injunction cannot be granted to prohibit an act which has already occurred.
[6] Fifth.
Was the ru.ling of the Oolifortlia court denying plaintiff's applicaHoll for a modification of the separate maintenance decree res judicata in the present action on the qtWStion of the 'Validity of the second Mexican divorce decree'
No. In denying plaintiff's application for a modification of the separate maintenance decree, the trial court made thc following finding: "For the purposes of this hearing, thcrc is no finding as to the validity or the invalidity of the Mexican decree of divorce obtaiIled by the defendant from the plaintiff on March 17, 1956."
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spencf', J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court determines what effect state courts will accord judgments of courts of sister states.
As to judgments of courts of foreign countries, however, state courts have generally held that state law is controlJing in the absence of treaties or federal legislation. (See Reesf', The Status in Tltis Oountry of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Columbo L. Rev. 783, 787.) For the most part they have followed the rules applicable to judgments of courts of sister states. Given the customary invocation of domicile as the touchstone of divorce jurisdiction in this country, they have generally invoked it also as to divorce decrees of courts of foreign countries. They have refused to recognize such de-' crees, absent the domicile of either party in the other country, even when that country does 110t require domirile as a ba:;;is for divorce. (See 28 N.Y.U.I.J. Rev. 742, [743] [744] [745] Critics, however, have pointed out that a country other than Rev. 193.) .
This court has never expressly ruled on the question whether a finding of domicile is prerequisite to the recognition in this state of a divorce decree rendered abroad. 1 Although there was a finding of domicile in this case, there should be no implication from the court's opinion herein that would preclude contacts with the foreign country other than domicile as a basis of jurisdiction.
Section 1915 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "A final judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction, according to the laws of sUch country, to pronounce the judgment, shall have the same effect as in the country where rendered, and also the same effect as final judgments rendered in this state." (Italics added.) The first task of the eourt is thus to determine whether or not the : 1In DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal.2d 521 [165 P.2d 457], we "usumed without deciding" that a divorce decree of a :Mexican court could be collaterally attacked here if the plaintift' had not been domiciled in the juris· diction granting the divorce. In Redi"ker v. Rediker. 35 Cal.2d 796 [221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152], we did not find it necessary to decide whether a foreign divorce decree could be attacked on these grounds, since it was to be assumed in tile absence of evidence to the contrary that the plaintiff was a. bona fide resillent of Cuba and that therefore the foreign court had jurisdiction even jf measured by our standards.
The 141-142.) There is no reason to read any requirement of domicile or bona fide residence into the statute. The status of persons as married or not married should be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. The valid judgments of courts of other countries should therefore be respected unless they run counter to local policy. The public policy of California may not permit the recognition of a foreign divorce decree when the foreign jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in the marital status of the parties, when the sole purpose of seeking the divorce in a foreign court is to evade the laws of this state (see Civ. Code, § § 150-150.4), or when the divorce is ex parte without reasonable notice to the defendant. No such problem arises in the present case, since plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Mexico, neither party was a resident of California, and the defendant had reasonable notice.
Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December , 17,1958. -. ......... ~
